GEN Dempsey to CJCS; GEN Odierno to Army Chief of Staff

State Dept. faces skyrocketing costs as it prepares to expand role in Iraq

Look at how hard it is to keep funding in place without DoD and the defense industrial complex taking the lead...

Pentagon to cut thousands of jobs

I heart Secretary Gates.

General Amos?

This article is right on in suggesting that Amos was chosen to kill the EFV. Sec. Gates (pbuh)!!! However, there is more to this story than meets the eye... plenty is not talked about in the article. ADM Mullen needs to be replaced soon... wouldn't it be nice to have a Chairman with actual ground combat experience relaying the service chiefs' views to the president and making recommendations? That could mean Mattis or Petraeus. This article suggests that Obama is terrified of Petraeus as a potential 2012 opponent - which I think is a rumor created solely by misinformed staffers that think Petraeus is a GOPper because he is a career military officer. Perhaps the president is terrified of him... as... dare I say it, an intellectual peer who is smarter than him? DADT doesn't play a part in this - let bozos like Odierno think that the administration actually cares about DADT... if they did Obama would have signed an executive order on January 20, 2009, ending it.

Odierno: I did great, mission accomplished, and all that jazz...make me Army Chief of Staff!!!

"Also, did I mention that, unlike GEN Casey, I think DADT should be repealed. Did I mention that?," Odierno said.
BLUF: Ray wants is to be named Army Chief of Staff after he leaves Iraq...

Watch CBS News Videos Online

Specializing in ad hominem attacks on GEN Odierno since 2008, this masthead maintains that flag officers who royally screw up once while in combat command shouldn't be give a second chance. GEN Odierno's career should have ended after his command of 4th Infantry Division. Instead, he will most likely be named Army Vice Chief or CSA.

Let me be clear: I'm really happy Iraq is shakily moving forward. My problem is that GEN Odierno should have been forced into retirement already. My fellow Georgetown Army ROTC alumnus, current Army CSA GEN George Casey, should have been relieved of command in Iraq after his first screw-up. I care about leadership failures because lives are at stake. Generals should be ready to command and produce immediately - without learning on the job and spilling the blood of our nation's best.

Like sands through the hourglass, so are the days of Odierno posts:

Nomination of LTG Odierno as MNF-I Commander (June 3, 2008)


Is Odierno ready? (September 16, 2008)


Odierno takes charge (September 16, 2008)


Odierno delivers… already! (September 16, 2008)


Everybody Loves Raymond (September 17, 2008)


For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point (September 30, 2008)


Odierno believes troops will be out of Iraq by 2011 (April 13, 2009)


Why We Should Get Rid of West Point (April 20, 2009)



Odierno speaks in a full sentence… (February 26, 2010)

Odierno speaks in a full sentence...

A svelte Ray modeling the new Army Service Uniform. He is still a leg...

...and requests more combat forces in Iraq past the deadline. As you can tell from previous posts, I'm not a huge fan of GEN Odierno. However, at least he is speaking up. I do question the timing of this though...

On another note, I love how after GEN Casey recommended to take it slowly on the repeal of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," GEN Odierno immediately piped up and said, "Oh, I favor repealing it." GEN Odierno is undoubtedly positioning himself to replace GEN Casey as Army Chief of Staff, which he most likely will get when GEN Casey finally retires. My crystal ball also predicts a GEN Petraeus nomination for Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, once Admiral Mullen finally retires.

U.S. troops may be sent to Iraq's Arab-Kurdish 'trigger line'

This is one conflict we do not want to get involved in, especially if our involvement "won't be full-on if we do it. It will just be to build confidence, then we will slowly pull ourselves out," according to GEN Odierno. The Kurds love us, but their opinion of us could quickly change if we are seen as protecting outsider Sunnis in what they view as their historic homeland (see Arab-Israeli conflict) or keep allowing our NATO "ally" Turkey to hunt for PKK Kurds in Northern Iraq. We could end up leaving Iraq with the Shiites (Arab and Persian), Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks, all hating us. Don't screw this one up, GEN Odierno.

Anti-war Briton Emma Sky is helping to reshape Iraq

Great article about a top Odierno advisor, Emma Sky. Ms. Sky is an anti-war Englishwoman who has been compared to Gertrude Bell. Both of these ladies are an inspiration; Ms. Sky was a major opponent of the war in Iraq, yet she has devoted her life towards ensuring the war's outcome is acceptable for her country and its main ally and the people of Iraq.

Ms Sky, 41, was working for the British Council in Manchester when the US and Britain entered Iraq in March 2003 - a war she strongly opposed. Eager to let Iraqis know that many in Europe were against the invasion, she volunteered for a team being sent by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to help to administer Iraq after the downfall of Saddam Hussein...

The year 2007 was a turning point in a war that had become increasingly brutal. A surge of 30,000 extra US troops, coupled with a decision by Sunni tribal leaders to turn against al-Qaeda under the payroll of the US military, finally started to reduce violence. At every step Ms Sky was at General Odierno's side, often working with him from 7am until 11pm, helping to look behind the faces of the “enemy”. “Who are these people? What do they want? What is their reason for using violence? It is not like they are just having a bad hair day or are completely deranged,” she said...

By slipping out on her own to meet different elements of Iraqi society, she provided an invaluable viewpoint for the US military, which had realised that it could not win the peace in Iraq through force alone. She ruffled feathers at times with her opinions, but was nonetheless listened to. “I have a seat at the table...so I have always been given that opportunity to be heard, to have that access to influence.”

Odierno believes troops will be out of Iraq by 2011

Odierno, looking slimmer (maybe he is preparing to attend Airborne school after not earning his wings during his tour at Ft. Bragg), is caught kissing up to President Obama on the video below.
"Please President Obama, make me CENTCOM Commander and/or Army Chief of Staff... please! I lost all of this weight to impress my fitness crazy boss, GEN Petraeus. I'm no longer a heavy drop. Did I mention I play basketball too sir?" said General Odierno. Share

For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point

In the rush to hand over power to the Iraqi central government, declare that Iraq is stable and the central government is capable, declare that the IA and the IPs are ready to handle security, declare a second (counterinsurgency) victory, and pull-out, the U.S. is once again on course to destroy the limited progress they have made in Iraq since the summer of 2006. This progress, whose underlying strategy was developed in 2006 by the civil-military relations team of 1st Armored Divisions's 1st Brigade Combat Team(+), and approved for implementation by COL(P) Sean MacFarland in Al Anbar, is something that was due in part to the Sunni allies in the Sons of Iraq (in addition to a whole host of other factors). Notice how this began before the famed surge.

Now with violence (at least in Baghdad and Al Anbar) down, coupled with Western journalists not reporting on frequent attacks in their Baghdad backyards (they never travel to areas where violence has recently been up like the previously quasi-tamed Tal Afar, Mosul, Basra, and parts of Diyala), the U.S. is once again about to make a tactical error with bad strategic effects. Instead of continually attempting to prop up a central government that cannot rule a country whose territorial boundaries were created by colonial line drawing, the U.S. needs to keep encouraging programs that allow the different groups in Iraq to self govern their own areas. The U.S., of course, will not do this because they fear that Iraq, although supposedly a federalist nation-state like the United States, will break apart into 18 separate countries or 3 separate countries with strong provincial governments along sectarian lines. God forbid the Iraqis develop a system of government that relies on traditional tribal leadership. Here is a look back on the late CPT Travis Patriquin’s presentation outlining his strategy for Al Anbar, which serves as an elementary introduction to the underlying tribal based strategy that began the Al Anbar Awakening and the influence of the Sons of Iraq: How to Win the War in Al Anbar

Another question to ask is what has the U.S. done lately to help out the 18 provincial governments? Nothing. If the U.S. continued to allow grassroots security initiatives (e.g. the Sons of Iraq protecting their areas from Shiites and the Shiite dominated central government), this may lead to a true federalist state or, إن شاء الله, the dissolution of the nation-state of Iraq into three separate nation-states each with strong provincial governments along the lines of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish. If the latter happens, إن شاء الله, then the U.S. would still have more Arab allies (Sunni Iraqis) and more Sunni allies in general (the Kurds).

What then is preventing the U.S. from doing this? It is often stated that neoconservatives believe that Iraq must be the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. What is not stated is that the neocons main goal is to get Iran to follow suit, after, of course, Iraq is the dreamed of Shiite beacon. We already have Sunni nation-states that tolerate us (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, etc.), what neocons want is a stable Shiite Iraq influencing Iran. Allowing for federalism to take root in Iraq, which might lead to partition, would not help the neocon cause. Ironically, the states' rights argument that conservatives often advocate for in America is exactly what they don't want the provinces in Iraq to have.

The best option is to continue to allow the Sons of Iraq to remain autonomous and not be handed over to the incompetent, Iranian-influenced, Shiite government. So what if Iran gains more influence over Shiites in Iraq and so what if there is a Shiite crescent spanning from Lebanon to Iran? Shia Islam is the minority form of Islam across the world! Aren't we supposed to be winning over the majority of the followers of Islam, winning over Sunnis to enlist them for help in fighting radical terrorist organizations like the Sunni Al Qaeda and Sunni Hamas, and showing Muslims that we are not on a Christian and Jewish crusade in the Middle East intent on wiping out Islam? Wouldn't showing support for the Sunnis in Iraq (to include the Kurds) make us look better to the majority Sunni states of Pakistan, Syria, Indonesia, and dare I say it, Palestine? We need to support the world majority Sunnis over the minority Shiites even if it means a Shiite crescent from Hezbollah dominated Lebanon, through Shiite Iraq, and Shiite Iran. With this support we could possibly win over the support of the majority of Muslims, who are Sunni, possibly win over the support of the majority of Palestinians, who are Sunni, and relegate Shiites to three disjointed areas with different goals (Hezbollah - anti-Israel, Shiite Iraq - who knows what their true goals are, and Shiite Iran - goal of a larger theocracy – maybe? - but are distrusted across the Arab world because they are Persian).

Here is are a few excerpts from the article:

"The big issue that concerns us is what happens if the [Shiite Iraqi] government drops the ball and stops paying these guys," said Capt. Parsana Deoki, 32, of New York. "You'd have up to 400 SOI without jobs, without an income. That presents a problem. They have military training and access to weapons -- unemployed, with weapons, young men with an established chain of command. You can fill in the blanks…"

But Sons of Iraq leaders say their relationships with police commanders have been forged under heavy U.S. pressure and remain beset by mutual distrust.
"I feel sorry to say this," said Zaied Subhi, a Sons of Iraq leader. "There is no trust between us…"

U.S. soldiers see Sons of Iraq leaders as extraordinary sources of intelligence, but what makes them so attractive as allies -- their connections to the insurgency -- is also what makes the prospect of their dissolution so alarming…

If the Sons of Iraq are effectively dissolved, with GEN Odierno's approval, it looks like GEN Odierno will get his chance to fight another conventional battle against a reconstituted Sunni insurgency… this, I think, is the first mistake of the reign of GEN Odierno caused in part by military officers allowing neoconservative strategic goals to shape policy in Iraq.

Everybody Loves Raymond

Well at least the Kagans at The Weekly Standard do...

Of particular interest is how GEN Odierno as MNC-I commander, though now a believer in counterinsurgency doctrine, is described as "The Patton of Counterinsurgency," who came to the conclusion that in order to implement Petraeus' counterinsurgency plan he needed to secure Baghdad. What was his conclusion? Securing Baghdad "required large-scale offensive combat operations outside the city." The Kagans also describe how Odierno used "traditional military concepts" like attacks on "lines-of-communication, support areas, and key terrain relevant to the counterinsurgency strategy" and went on a series of "brilliant offensives."

On another note, the Kagans criticize the American targeting process saying:

the killing of AQI leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi in June 2006 should have disrupted the al Qaeda network severely. But AQI rapidly regrouped after Zarqawi's death under a successor, Abu Ayyub al Masri. The American counterterrorism approach disrupted the network but did not eliminate it. AQI's ability to generate violence in Baghdad through its signature vehicle bombs actually increased in the months after Zarqawi's death, as did civilian casualties and Shia retaliatory attacks. The entire cycle of violence that attacks on the terrorist network were supposed to bring under control actually ramped up.

The problem with the targeting process isn't intelligence as the Kagans suggest, but it is who the U.S. goes after after receiving the actionable intelligence. The U.S. always goes after terrorist leaders because it plays well in the media by making us look like we are winning the war. However, the key is to go after the low level people within the organizations that link the different terrorist organizations together. By going after the lower level jihadists and eliminating the links between organizations, we can weaken the leaders and the organizations they lead. In sum, we should act as a picador during a bullfight, who weakens the bull for its eventual death at the hands of the matador. The U.S., as picador, will not get the glory of the matador because we will not deliver the fatal blow - the members of the terrorist organization who now view their leader, the bull, as weak, will.

See also:
First Recommendation for GEN Petraeus from "Afghanistan Is in Its Worst Shape Since 2001"

Odierno takes charge

General Odierno propaganda art
[courtesy of the The Weekly Standard]

From The Guardian today:

The physically imposing Odierno, who will be promoted to four-star general, was a relative latecomer to the hearts and minds techniques of Petraeus. During his first stint in Iraq in 2003, when he commanded the 4th Infantry Division, Odierno was responsible for an area north of Baghdad known as the Sunni triangle, which included Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's home town.

Few US military commanders or soldiers have much good to say about Odierno's aggressive tactics. His division's mistreatment of Iraqis and the heavy use of artillery appalled others within the country's armed forces.

Army reporters and commanders said Odierno's unit - a heavy armoured division, despite its name – used an iron-fist strategy that may have appeared to pacify the area in the short term, but alienated large parts of the population. Some argue that the behaviour of the 4th Infantry Division helped create the insurgency.

"Fourth ID fuelled the insurgency," an army psychological operations officer told Thomas Ricks in his book on the Iraq war, Fiasco. An unnamed general said bluntly: "The 4th ID – what they did was a crime."

Odierno defended his troops' conduct by saying his men faced a population more hostile than in the rest of Iraq and had to act accordingly. The capture of Saddam in an underground bunker in December 2003 by Odierno's soldiers did little to dispel their cowboy image.

The division's tactics contrasted with those of Petraeus, whose troops complemented searches of ex-Baathists' homes with meetings with tribal chiefs and community projects such as rebuilding schools and painting over old murals of Saddam. Petraeus went on to rewrite the US military's counter-insurgency manual and then took overall command in Iraq.

Odierno was slow in recognising the strength of the insurgency at the start of 2004. At the time, he told reporters that the insurgents had been "brought to their knees". He was not alone in his overconfidence. A few months later, violence erupted and US forces all but ceded control of places such as Fallujah to the rebels...

Odierno is now a convert to the Petraeus approach, telling troops it is their job to protect the population and that counter-insurgency takes time.

From Al Jazeera today:

General Ray Odierno, a US military commander known for his aggressive tactics, has taken command of US-led forces in Iraq, replacing General David Petraeus.... [the 4ID] used a heavy-handed strategy that has been accused of devastating large parts of the Iraqi population. It was Odierno's soldiers who captured Saddam in December 2003. <>But later, he appeared to have adopted Petraeus's approach... He has argued consistently against sharp cutbacks in troop levels in Iraq, which is negotiating a controversial security pact with Washington to determine troop levels that will remain in Iraq after a UN mandate expires at the end of the year.

Here is a copy of General Petraeus' farewell letter to the troops:

Finally, a picture from the change of command ceremony:

Is Odierno ready?

GEN Raymond Odierno, new MNF-I commander, contemplating
OPERATION KIBBLES 'N BITS

I have maintained from the beginning that the only reasons GEN Raymond Odierno, a career artillery officer, continues to be promoted is because his wife runs a great officers' wives club, his son was badly injured in Iraq, and he is a yes man [see Nomination of LTG Odierno for MNF-I commander]. As a major general in command of the 4th Infantry Division (4ID), Odierno overflooded Abu Gharib and did not even know what counterinsurgency was. Meanwhile, his peer, then MG David Petraeus, referred to as "King David" by Iraqi tribal leaders and mocked as a "perfumed prince" by fellow officers who thought his tactics were ridiculous, followed a much different course. Petraeus, the "pied piper of Northern Iraq" in NBC parlance, was constantly preaching about "winning hearts and minds" in Mosul and was billed "Iraq's Repairman" by Newsweek; clearly he got it from the beginning. In striking comparison, the only nickname Odierno, a New Jersey native, earned was "Tony Soprano." Odierno shunned Petraeus' tactics and instead followed the limited guidance given to him in the sermons of his boss, LTG Ricky Sanchez, who also happened to be Petraeus' boss. Odierno killed or captured the Iraqi "bandits" while denying that there was an insurgency, all tenets of the Sanchez Doctrine. Here is an Odierno quote from a June 18, 2003, USA Today article:

"Although major combat operations have concluded, our soldiers are involved in almost daily contact with noncompliant forces, former regime members and common criminals," said Odierno, whose troops operate north of Baghdad to Kirkuk and east to the Iranian border. The area includes Tikrit, Saddam's former hometown.

"We are seeing military activity throughout our zone, but I really qualify it as militarily insignificant," Odierno told Pentagon reporters in a video conference from Tikrit. He added that the attacks are "having no impact on the way we conduct business on a day-to-day basis."

Apparently, Odierno just didn't get it! Doesn't America deserve adaptive leaders with foresight and vision? Odierno's performance as a division commander should have ended his career, but it didn't.

Odierno began to see the light in the summer of 2004 when Petraeus was promoted ahead of him to lieutenant general on May 18, and his son lost his left arm due to injuries sustained in an ambush. From that point on, Odierno worshipped at the altar of counterinsurgency. Odierno read the French Coptic texts of David Galula and the Gospels of John, also known as Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife and FM 3-24. Odierno forced himself to believe that his diminutive former peer, David, could perform miracles and slay Goliath.

I truly hope that I am wrong about Odierno and he can run this war himself. Hopefully, his years of Counterinsurgency Bible study have prepared him for his apostolic succession. I hope that he is thinking of what the transition from counterinsurgency operations to nation building entails and reads Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, by Francis Fukuyama of The End of History and the Last Man fame, as a way to start to wrap his mind around the issues he could face. I hope he is prepared to start from scratch if the oil spots dry up; this time, however, there will be no surge forces available to keep the peace unless the selective service system is activated. I also hope he is prepared to execute a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq and take the last chopper out of Baghdad if he is called to do so (which I think is highly unlikely). Finally, I hope that he does not take Petraeus' focus off of the strategic issues he needs to deal with as CENTCOM commander and he will not be calling Petraeus every few hours asking him what to do...

Odierno will have an able corps commander to help him, LTG Lloyd Austin, who, while serving as the ADC-M for the 3ID during the initial invasion of Iraq, was awarded the Silver Star. Austin, an infantry officer with numerous light infantry commands, is described as a "soldier's soldier" by peers and will bring a needed perspective to the heavy handed Odierno, who has a proclivity, as evidenced by his command of the 4ID, to fall back on his more than 25 years of conventional/force-on-force/3GW warfare training as a heavy artillery officer. On Monday, when asked if he thought progress could be moved along any faster or if he expected any changes from Petraeus to Odierno, Austin said, "I'm not sure that pushing them [the Iraqi government, the IA, and IPs] forward is the right thing that we want to do. We tried that once before and found that that didn't work." Hopefully, Odierno's heavy hand does not reverse the limited gains made in Iraq during the reign of the infallible David and he does not prove the Peter Principle as MNF-I commander, which I argue he already proved as a major general from March 2003 to April 2004.

See also:

Odierno's Conversion

Nomination of LTG Odierno for MNF-I commander

Petraeus says by fall he may seek Iraq troop cuts

Once again, the military is rewarding failure. Some prior examples:

1. LTG Chiarelli to MNC-I commander after mixed results as 1st Cavalry Division commander in Baghdad.

2. GEN Casey to Army Chief of Staff after a numbing performance as MNF-I commander.

3. LTG Odierno to MNC-I commander after using heavy handed tactics and overflooding the prisons at Abu Gharib when he was commander of 4th Infantry Division.

Now, once again, LTG Odierno and LTG Chiarelli have been nominated for promotions. LTG Odierno has been nominated for promotion to general and to become MNF-I commander, meanwhile LTG Chiarelli has been nominated for promotion to general and to Army Vice Chief of Staff. How much does one have to fail at the top levels in the Army in order to be forced to retire? LTG Odierno and GEN Casey are lauded as counterinsurgency converts, but where were they before counterinsurgency became the term de jour in military parlance? They were flooding prisons and getting mixed results as commanders. Wouldn't one expect a career Army officer to recognize an insurgency when he sees one instead of taking years and thousands of American lives? GEN Casey, LTG Odierno, and LTG Chiarelli's wives must run a mean officers' wives club.

GEN Petraeus and LTG Odierno were division commanders under the Peter Principle proving LTG Sanchez when our overarching strategy in Iraq was to kill and capture bandits and denying there was an insurgency... Odierno did exactly what Sanchez wanted - kill and capture bandits. Odierno excelled at the capture part and overflooded Abu Gharib (remember that?), while GEN Petraeus did his own thing up north (think back to the often-mocked "winning hearts and minds" mantra). Then Odierno was promoted to lieutenant general and suddenly became a counterinsurgency convert under his former peer Petraeus after a career as a "big guns go boom" artillery officer. On a side note to those who hate "legs," how is Odierno non-airborne qualified after spending years at Ft. Bragg? Meanwhile, a PhD holding, Tal-Afar saving, counterinsurgency expert like COL McMaster was passed over for brigadier general twice (H.R. McMaster Passed Over - Reverse Peter Principle?), and a career green beret like LTG McChrystal is not given MNC-I or MNF-I command. GEN Petraeus can only do so much with a sloppy joe officer corps above the rank of the few good captains that stayed in the Army. I wonder what maneuver Odierno, the inadaptable artillery officer, will make after MNF-I command? I wonder how many hours a day he will pull GEN Petraeus away from his strategic tasks (e.g. drug trade, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.) as CENTCOM commander asking him exactly what to do every step of the way as MNF-I commander?

**NOTE: This piece was written prior to COL McMaster being picked up for brigadier general (See H.R. McMaster Leads New Crop of Generals) and immediately after it was leaked that LTG Odierno was being nominated for MNF-I command