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Wednesday, June 4, 2008

Cyberspace Wars: Militarization of Virtual Front

This is an interesting article. However, I do not agree with the assertion that, "A modern army cannot be effective without huge but vulnerable computer information systems." What are the FCS systems doing for the troops living amidst the populace in patrol bases in Baghdad, Ramadi, and Mosul? Nothing. I think a modern army can be effective without such systems. Furthermore, it may even be more effective without them because leaders would be forced to take decisive action without guidance from higher, without worrying about the brigade commander in the tactical operations center watching their every move on television, and without having to worry about cyberwar. A map is not subject to electronic warfare and cyberattack, but Blue Force Tracker, GPS, and a whole host of other technologies are. Getting rid of these systems, although hurting the military's capability to wage second generation warfare, does not make the force combat ineffective. In some ways, it would improve a military's ability to wage war. For example, its ability to wage third and fourth generation warfare effectively would be improved because it would help create decisive leaders at the company, platoon, and squad level that do not rely on their highest ranking military officers for guidance. These types of leaders are frowned upon in the military today... no wonder the counterinsurgency campaigns waged have not been the most effective.

I will close with a quote from Lind et al.'s article from the October 1989 Marine Corps Gazette entitled The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation:
Terrorism, Technology, and Beyond

Again, we are not suggesting terrorism is the fourth generation. It is not a new phenomenon, and so far it has proven largely ineffective. However, what do we see if we combine terrorism with some of the new technology we have discussed? For example, that effectiveness might the terrorist have if his car bomb were a product of genetic engineering rather than high explosives? To draw our potential fourth generation out still further, what if we combined terrorism, high technology, and the following additional elements?

-A non-national or transnational base, such as an ideology or religion. Our national security capabilities are designed to operate within a nation-state framework. Outside that framework, they have great difficulties. The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traffic has no nation-state base, it is very difficult to attack. The nation-state shields the drug lords but cannot control them. We cannot attack them without violating the sovereignty of a friendly nation. A fourth-generation attacker could well operate in a similar manner, as some Middle Eastern terrorists already do.

-A direct attack on the enemy's culture. Such an attack works from within as well as from without. It can bypass not only the enemy's military but the state itself. The United States is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack in the form of the drug traffic. Drugs directly attack our culture. They have the support of a powerful "fifth column," the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus despite our best efforts. Some ideological elements in South America see drugs as a weapon; they call them the "poor man's intercontinental ballistic missile." They prize the drug traffic not only for the money it brings in through which we finance the war against ourselves — but also for the damage it does to the hated North Americans.

-Highly sophisticated psychological warfare, especially through manipulation of the media, particularly television news. Some terrorists already know how to play this game. More broadly, hostile forces could easily take advantage of a significant product of television reporting — the fact that on television the enemy's casualties can be almost as devastating on the home front as are friendly casualties. If we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy civilian dead brought into every living room in the country on the evening news can easily turn what may have been a military success (assuming we also hit the military target) into a serious defeat.

All of these elements already exist. They are not the product of "futurism," of gazing into a crystal ball. We are simply asking what would we face if they were all combined? Would such a combination constitute at least the beginnings of a fourth generation of warfare? One thought that suggests they might is that third (not to speak of second) generation militaries would seem to have little capability against such a synthesis. This is typical of generational shifts.

The purpose of this paper is to pose a question, not to answer it. The partial answers suggested here may in fact prove to be false leads. But in view of the fact that third generation warfare is now over 70 years old, we should be asking ourselves the question, what will the fourth generation be?
Today, al Qaeda profits from the drug trade among other things. Our inability to stop the 90 percent of the world's opium produced in Afghanistan from getting to the market seems to be one realization Lind et al.'s warnings...

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