Apathy and Corruption in Afghanistan

As the U.S. military sets out to secure cities including Kandahar, it is relying far more heavily on Afghan forces than at any time in the past nine years, when the American mission focused mainly on defeating the Taliban in the countryside, rather than securing the population. But the Afghan forces are proving poorly equipped and sometimes unmotivated, breeding the same frustration U.S. troops felt in Iraq when they began building up security forces beset by corruption, sectarianism, political meddling and militia infiltration...

The United States and other Western allies still plan to inject hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands more troops into Kandahar and surrounding villages this year to try to wrest control of Taliban strongholds and allow breathing room for the expansion of government services in an area that has been effectively lawless for decades...

The vast majority of police officers in Kandahar are illiterate. The allocation of fuel they get from the Interior Ministry is either insufficient or partially stolen virtually every month. Officers are dependent on NATO troops for everything from fuel, ammunition and bottled water for checkpoints to generators and air conditioners for police stations.

Corruption is institutionalized throughout the ranks, and American soldiers say Taliban spies and sympathizers have infiltrated the force.

The former police chief at the station Rathmann is embedded in was dismissed recently for suspected links to insurgents. His deputy was locked up briefly for allegedly stealing cases of bottled water.

The new chief defends officers' right to collect bribes, pointing out that their starting pay -- $210 a month -- is grossly inadequate...

U.S. Soldiers battling hard in Iraqi city

Mosul went from having first the 3/2ID and then the 172nd SBCT from 2004-2006 patrolling its streets and managing violence to having only one battalion in late summer 2006... where was the 172nd SBCT sent? Baghdad.

Tal Afar, just 30 miles west of Mosul, went from having first COL(P) H.R. McMaster's 3rd ACR and then COL(P) Sean MacFarland's 1/1AD patrolling its streets and managing violence from 2004-2006 to having one battalion in 2006... where were these troops sent? Ramadi.

What cities are safer today than in 2006? Baghdad and Ramadi.

What cities are less safe today than in 2006? Mosul and Tal Afar.

What cities are next door to Kurdistan and Turkey? Mosul and Tal Afar.

What two entities have terroritorial claims/interests in Northern Iraq? Kurdistan and Turkey.

Is all of this coincidental? I think not.

Has the surge worked? See mixed results above...



The fact of the matter is we still need more troops to "win," even after the famed surge. Related, but a little off topic, I wanted to ask the question, "Whose side are we on when it comes to the Kurds and the Turks?" Turkey is not just any member of NATO, but an Arab member. Meanwhile, the Kurds, frankly, love us! They, to me, are as American as apple pie. We need to solve this problem before it comes down to the pro-American Kurds versus a NATO ally. Or perhaps we could leverage their mutual interests in Northern Iraq into two different "security" agreements whereby the Kurds and Turks manage Northern Iraq for us? I guarantee there would be less violence after the initial, using a phrase made famous by the Kagans, "brilliant offensive."

"Fine, Mr. President. You're the president."

A dysfunctional family

While I have not yet read Bob Woodward's latest installment on the presidency of George W. Bush, The War Within: A Secret White House History 2006-2008, The Washington Post's excerpt from September 8, 2008, gave me new faith in the military officer corps (well, at least the service chiefs).

While reading this piece, my jaw dropped - I never expected that so much opposition to the surge had been voiced by the senior brass. It seemed as if Woodward was describing a dysfunctional family... This dysfunctional family included the uncle that just wouldn't go away, retired General Jack Keane, former Army vice chief of staff, who circumvented the Joint Chiefs of Staff to pitch his "plans" to the president.
A well-meaning, but ineffective General Peter Pace, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who laments about having no fallback plan on the surge... if it doesn't work, he laments, "then you are forced into conscription, which no one wants to talk about." He appeared to be the flag officer equivalent of Beaver Cleaver telling W. Cleaver, "Gee, Dad, I have enough trouble keeping myself in line with your plans without keeping all the other chiefs in line."
A brazenly outspoken General Peter Schoomaker, then Army Chief of Staff, who criticized General Pace, and was always thinking of the future. "Folks keep talking about the readiness of U.S. forces. Ready to do what? We need to look at our strategic depth for handling other threats. How do we get bigger? And how do we make what we have today more ready? This is not just about Iraq! I feel like Nero did when Rome was burning. It just worries the hell out of me," Schoomaker said doing his best impression of always contrary Alex P. Keaton.
A forward thinking chipmunk named Simon, played by Admiral Mike Mullen, then Chief of Naval Operations, questioning, "How does a five-brigade surge over the next few months fit into the larger picture? We have so many other issues and challenges: Afghanistan, Pakistan, North Korea, and places we are not even thinking about today."
And finally, General John Abizaid, then CENTCOM commander, and General George Casey, then commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq, who had lost control of the war (which was quite obvious to the servicemembers on the ground during his reign...). They were the equivalents of Statler and Waldorf of Muppets' fame watching the play unfold from their palatial balcony.

General Pace explaining to then MNF-I commander, General Casey, what his new strategy is... as directed by Condoleezza Rice, Stephen Hadley, and Meghan O'Sullivan

The scene culminates with the surge being briefed to the service chiefs. President Bush came "armed with what Hadley called 'sweeteners' - more budget money and a promise to increase the size of the active-duty Army and Marine Corps." General Schoomaker fought the president arguing that the Army was at its breaking point saying, "I don't think you have the time to surge and generate enough forces for this thing to continue to go."
The conversation ended with, "Pete, I'm the president," Bush said. "And I've got the time."
"Fine, Mr. President. You're the president," Schoomaker replied.

I have not had this much faith in the Army Officer Corps since I was a cadet. It appears that General Schoomaker and Admiral Mullen fought the good fight, and General Pace attempted to at his level, albeit with little success. I am proud that the service chiefs are thinking 20-30 years down the road... Unfortunately, they lost. I have a feeling that they see the same thing I am seeing in my crystal ball - emerging regional hegemons that are near peer competitors and a broken Army and Marine Corps with a hollowed out officer corps unable to fight and win America's wars in the relatively near future.

Fear Keeps Iraqis Out of Their Baghdad Homes

If this is the case, then how well exactly has "the surge" truly worked?