Suicide Bomb Kills Dozens In Baghdad's Largest Sunni Mosque

Hopefully, we aren't going to be in Iraq for this edition of the Sunni-Shiite Civil War...


See previous posts:

Violence highlights fears of Iraqi security forces taking over after U.S. leaves

Shiites in Iraq Show Restraint as Sunnis Keep Attacking

Shiite Control Raises Tensions with Sunni Groups

For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point

Violence highlights fears of Iraqi security forces taking over after U.S. leaves

Not that long ago...

Al-Askari Mosque
[February 2006]

The Situation

Sorry, Mike Sorrentino, but this is a "situation" that more Americans should care about:

New Shiite Alliance Excludes Iraqi Prime Minister

The Iraqi Shiite link to Iran has been overblown and is an example of how ignorant we are in the West. Iranians, of which 89 percent are Shiite, are very proud of Persian history and our simplistic view of their influence on Iraqi Shiites (60-65 percent of the Iraqi population is Shiite versus 32-27 percent Sunni) should outrage them - it dismisses the cultural differences between Arabs and Persians.

Most Westerners know of the Roman Empires, but know little of the great Persian Empires. If Westerners used the simple outlook they use in examining Shiite Islam in Iraq and Iran to examine Western Christianity, they would overlook the cultural differences that broke Western Christianity apart (Roman Catholicism versus the Anglican communion, differences within the Anglican communion across the globe, differences between the Anglican communion and other Protestants, the development of the Lutheran and Presbyterian Churches in Northern Europe, etc.). Just as German Roman Catholics are much different than American ones, Arab Shiites (Iraq) are much different than Persian Shiites (Iran).

What I am getting at is that there is more to culture than religion. Language, for one, plays a huge role. To use the Western European example again, Latin morphed into the modern day romance languages and Roman Catholicism lost its total grip on Western Europe. Although I am no expert, as an ignorant Westerner myself, the Persian Empire morphed over time too; the linguistic differences between modern Iraq (Arabic) and Iran (Farsi) are hard to overlook. Only 1 percent of Iranians speak Arabic, and Farsi is rarely heard in Iraq. Scholars in Iran, like Ahmad Kasravi, spent years trying to "cleanse" the Farsi language of Arabic words and influence.



What else brought about this cultural divide? Although Iran has been officially Shiite since the Safavid dynasty in the 16th Century and Iraq has been a part of Iranzamin ("Greater Iran") for centuries, colonial rule and the subsequent modern nation-states of Iraq and Iran have helped to magnify the cultural differences between Iraq and Iran. The "little" mountain range, known as the Zagros (see map below), separating Iraq and Iran has become a geological Berlin Wall between the Arab Shiite and Persian Shiite areas of Iranzamin and allowed for more Arab influence on Iraq.

Also, the two countries fought an eight year war not too long ago. Obviously I have left things out, but the main point is Iraqi Shiites are different from Iranian Shiites!

Anyhow, back to article that brought about this tirade...

With regards to the new Shiite political alliance in Iraq, it appears that proportional representation parliamentary democracy really is taking shape in Iraq. Here is an excerpt from the article linked above:

The new bloc, called the Iraqi National Alliance, will include the largest Shiite party, the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, or SIIC, and al-Sadr's bloc, which both have close ties to Tehran.

Although some small Sunni and secular parties are joining the alliance, many Sunnis consider the Supreme Council as little more than an instrument of Shiite Iran.

If the alliance does well in the Jan. 16 vote, Tehran could gain deeper influence in Iraq as U.S. forces pull back, with a full American withdrawal planned by the end of 2011.

Al-Maliki's Dawa Party also has close ties to Iran, but the prime minister has tried in recent years to persuade Tehran to stop interfering in Iraq. Iran is accused of supporting Shiite militias, despite its denials of the allegations.

U.S. troops may be sent to Iraq's Arab-Kurdish 'trigger line'

This is one conflict we do not want to get involved in, especially if our involvement "won't be full-on if we do it. It will just be to build confidence, then we will slowly pull ourselves out," according to GEN Odierno. The Kurds love us, but their opinion of us could quickly change if we are seen as protecting outsider Sunnis in what they view as their historic homeland (see Arab-Israeli conflict) or keep allowing our NATO "ally" Turkey to hunt for PKK Kurds in Northern Iraq. We could end up leaving Iraq with the Shiites (Arab and Persian), Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks, all hating us. Don't screw this one up, GEN Odierno.

Shiites in Iraq Show Restraint as Sunnis Keep Attacking

It is a far cry from 2006, when a bomb set off at the sacred Shiite shrine in Samarra killed no one, but ignited a fury at the sacrilege that set off two years of sectarian warfare.

This year the equally important shrine of Kadhimiya in Baghdad, the tomb of two revered Shiite imams, was attacked by suicide bombers twice, in January and April. More than a hundred people were killed, but there was no retaliation.

Bombing Shiite mosques has become so common that Sunni extremists have been forced to look elsewhere to provoke outrage — much as they did in 2005, when Shiites similarly showed patience when attacked. They have attacked groups of Shiite refugees waiting for food rations, children gathering for handouts of candy, lines of unemployed men hoping for a day’s work, school buses, religious pilgrimages, weddings, marketplaces and hospitals in Shiite areas and even the funerals of their victims from the day before.

Iraq’s Shiites, counseled by their political and religious leaders and habituated to suffering by centuries as the region’s underclass, have refused to rise to the bait — for now. Instead, they have made a virtue of forbearance and have convinced their followers that they win by not responding with violence.

Arab-Israeli (and Persian) Conflict

Good op-ed that briefly describes the tensions between Arabs and Persians in the Middle East.

Tensions Stoked Between Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis

There is no surprise here. As predicted, Northern Iraq is falling apart despite the great work Hannibal, Murdock, and B.A. Baracus, did up there in 2005-2006. Although it was recently viewed as a pleasant, up and coming area with a diverse population and a Whole Foods and Starbucks in every town, it is far from it.

American officials have long feared a military conflict in the north, where Arabs and Kurds have competing claims to territory and have legions of trained men under arms. The struggle for power has also fueled the insurgency in the north, giving groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia an opening to appear to back an Arab cause. And it comes as American combat troops are scheduled to withdraw from Iraqi cities by the end of June.

I have argued that this is mostly due to troop level drawdowns in the area. Anyhow, here is what I wrote on September 17, 2008:
U.S. Soldiers battling hard in Iraqi city

Iraqi Housing Crisis

For Sunnis, An Uneasy Return Home

Across Baghdad, Iraqis are trickling back to onetime sectarian killing zones, in an attempt to reclaim their houses and former lives. While Sunnis are emboldened by a sharp decrease in violence and protection from the Iraqi government, many wonder whether they can trust the predominantly Shiite security forces and whether they can resume living among neighbors who once sought to kill them.

"It will take a very strong law to bring Sunnis back to Hurriyah," said a senior Shiite police official who would give only the nickname Abu Ahmed. "As Iraqis, it is difficult for us to forget those who were killed. It needs a long time."

Since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion, more than 5 million Iraqis -- one of five citizens -- have fled their homes, according to the International Organization for Migration. Only a small fraction have returned.

In Hurriyah, of the more than 7,000 Sunni families who fled in late 2006, roughly 325 have reclaimed their houses, mostly in the past month. A middle-class enclave in western Baghdad, Hurriyah is a sprawling jigsaw of tan mosques, shop fronts and modest houses.

U.N. officials and human rights groups are concerned that a speedy resettlement could touch off new strife, in part because sectarian segregation has helped to reduce violence. Already, Shiites who occupied Sunni houses are being pushed out, often by force, and returning Sunnis have come under attack. U.S. military officials, wary that a sudden influx of returnees could undermine security gains, say they are proceeding carefully...

One day last month, Ahmed Gizhar, 54, and wife Salwa Mizher, 45, walked into Farook Mosque, a Sunni shrine that is now an Iraqi army base. For two years, the couple occupied a Sunni house in Hurriyah. That morning, six Sunni men representing the owner gave them three days to leave. Gizhar came to the base to complain to the government that was backing his eviction.

"What can I do?" Gizhar asked 2nd Lt. Hussein Rahim, 38, a burly man with a thick mustache. "I am sick. We cannot afford to rent a house."

Gizhar, who needs a cane to walk, said he owned three houses in Khan Dari, a town north of Baghdad, but couldn't return because Sunni insurgents controlled the area. "If I go back, they will behead me," Gizhar said, crumpling into tears.

He bent over. His hands cupped his face, his body shook. "I hope to die. I hate my life. Death is better than living like this."

Gizhar demanded to know Rahim's sect, but the soldier would say only that he was "Iraqi..."

Kareem Abdullah, a senior Mahdi Army commander, said he welcomed "the good Sunni families" back to Hurriyah. His own neighbor had returned, he said. But another returnee suspected of being an insurgent fled after militiamen tried to kill him, he said.

Since Sadr announced a cease-fire last year, his force has gone underground. Many of his fighters, Abdullah said, have joined the police force and are monitoring the Sunni returnees.

"Of course, we will keep our eyes on them," said Abdullah, a tailor, who said he and his men had executed about 20 Sunnis during the expulsion of 2006. "We can't make the old mistakes again. The killers can't come back again."

Shiite Control Raises Tensions with Sunni Groups

How does the Shiite Government consolidate the use of force without abandoning Sunni groups that have been instrumental in establishing order in Iraq?

That is the central question facing leaders in Iraq as they go forward in attempting to build a government inside of Iraq. Looking forward, if the government is to establish itself it must be sure to gain legitimacy with both Sunni and Shi'a. As the government continues to consolidate power one central goal must be to find work for unneeded security forces. As quoted in The Washington Post article:

The big issue that concerns us is what happens if the government drops the ball and stops paying these guys," said Capt. Parsana Deoki, 32, of New York. "You'd have up to 400 SOI without jobs, without an income. That presents a problem. They have military training and access to weapons -- unemployed, with weapons, young men with an established chain of command. You can fill in the blanks."

This paragraph illuminates the danger of neglecting these groups once they've outgrown their perceived usefulness and later on the article explains why letting these Sunni groups let loose is so alarming - their ability to gather intelligence. From The Washington Post:

U.S. soldiers see Sons of Iraq leaders as extraordinary sources of intelligence, but what makes them so attractive as allies -- their connections to the insurgency -- is also what makes the prospect of their dissolution so alarming.

So keeping these Sons of Iraq employed is paramount to the efforts of U.S. and Iraqi ground troops. Their presence as allies reminds me of the natives v.s. tourists question that often arises in economic questions. Essentially the difference between the Sunni groups (natives) and the Tourists (Coalition forces) is information. Natives have more information than tourists. They know everyone in town, the good restaurants, and how much you should be paying for goods and services. Tourists, on the other hand, have little information and therefore pay more for goods and services because they don't know any better.

Since the surge, the U.S. and Iraqi government forces have bought their way around this problem - paying the natives for information. What will the natives do once the tourists are no longer willing to pay? The answer to that question is critical.

Blast Targeting Lebanese Army Kills 5

Shaker al-Abssi, leader of Fatah al-Islam

Fatah al-Islam, a Sunni extremist organization with ties to Al Qaeda, is being blamed for this bombing. This is probably a result of the Shia Hezbollah's greater influence in Lebanon and, to use a term that should be revived in the American vernacular, jives with the June 2008 statement made by Shaker al-Abssi, leader of Fatah al-Islam, criticizing Shiites in Lebanon and claiming that the U.S. supports Shiites in Iran and Iraq. Can you feel the love? Here is an excerpt from The Washington Post:

A car bomb exploded near a military bus in the northern city of Tripoli on Monday, killing five people, including four soldiers, and injuring more than 30.

The bombing revived worries about the presence of militant Islamist groups in the city, where government forces last year battled a group with alleged links to al-Qaeda.

Monday's attack, the second to target the army in Tripoli in less than six weeks, took place during the morning rush hour on a road leading to several schools. Security officials said the bomb was placed in a private Renault sedan and was detonated by remote control.

The attack occurred two days after a bombing in Damascus, the Syrian capital, but Lebanese leaders discounted the possibility of a connection...

As in a similar bombing on Aug. 13 that left 14 dead, including nine soldiers, observers blamed Fatah al-Islam, an Islamist group that battled Lebanese forces for 15 weeks last year. The army eventually prevailed, but some members of the group were not apprehended.

For some more background:
Radical Group Pulls In Sunnis As Lebanon's Muslims Polarize

For U.S. and Sunni Allies, a Turning Point

In the rush to hand over power to the Iraqi central government, declare that Iraq is stable and the central government is capable, declare that the IA and the IPs are ready to handle security, declare a second (counterinsurgency) victory, and pull-out, the U.S. is once again on course to destroy the limited progress they have made in Iraq since the summer of 2006. This progress, whose underlying strategy was developed in 2006 by the civil-military relations team of 1st Armored Divisions's 1st Brigade Combat Team(+), and approved for implementation by COL(P) Sean MacFarland in Al Anbar, is something that was due in part to the Sunni allies in the Sons of Iraq (in addition to a whole host of other factors). Notice how this began before the famed surge.

Now with violence (at least in Baghdad and Al Anbar) down, coupled with Western journalists not reporting on frequent attacks in their Baghdad backyards (they never travel to areas where violence has recently been up like the previously quasi-tamed Tal Afar, Mosul, Basra, and parts of Diyala), the U.S. is once again about to make a tactical error with bad strategic effects. Instead of continually attempting to prop up a central government that cannot rule a country whose territorial boundaries were created by colonial line drawing, the U.S. needs to keep encouraging programs that allow the different groups in Iraq to self govern their own areas. The U.S., of course, will not do this because they fear that Iraq, although supposedly a federalist nation-state like the United States, will break apart into 18 separate countries or 3 separate countries with strong provincial governments along sectarian lines. God forbid the Iraqis develop a system of government that relies on traditional tribal leadership. Here is a look back on the late CPT Travis Patriquin’s presentation outlining his strategy for Al Anbar, which serves as an elementary introduction to the underlying tribal based strategy that began the Al Anbar Awakening and the influence of the Sons of Iraq: How to Win the War in Al Anbar

Another question to ask is what has the U.S. done lately to help out the 18 provincial governments? Nothing. If the U.S. continued to allow grassroots security initiatives (e.g. the Sons of Iraq protecting their areas from Shiites and the Shiite dominated central government), this may lead to a true federalist state or, إن شاء الله, the dissolution of the nation-state of Iraq into three separate nation-states each with strong provincial governments along the lines of Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish. If the latter happens, إن شاء الله, then the U.S. would still have more Arab allies (Sunni Iraqis) and more Sunni allies in general (the Kurds).

What then is preventing the U.S. from doing this? It is often stated that neoconservatives believe that Iraq must be the beacon of democracy in the Middle East. What is not stated is that the neocons main goal is to get Iran to follow suit, after, of course, Iraq is the dreamed of Shiite beacon. We already have Sunni nation-states that tolerate us (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, etc.), what neocons want is a stable Shiite Iraq influencing Iran. Allowing for federalism to take root in Iraq, which might lead to partition, would not help the neocon cause. Ironically, the states' rights argument that conservatives often advocate for in America is exactly what they don't want the provinces in Iraq to have.

The best option is to continue to allow the Sons of Iraq to remain autonomous and not be handed over to the incompetent, Iranian-influenced, Shiite government. So what if Iran gains more influence over Shiites in Iraq and so what if there is a Shiite crescent spanning from Lebanon to Iran? Shia Islam is the minority form of Islam across the world! Aren't we supposed to be winning over the majority of the followers of Islam, winning over Sunnis to enlist them for help in fighting radical terrorist organizations like the Sunni Al Qaeda and Sunni Hamas, and showing Muslims that we are not on a Christian and Jewish crusade in the Middle East intent on wiping out Islam? Wouldn't showing support for the Sunnis in Iraq (to include the Kurds) make us look better to the majority Sunni states of Pakistan, Syria, Indonesia, and dare I say it, Palestine? We need to support the world majority Sunnis over the minority Shiites even if it means a Shiite crescent from Hezbollah dominated Lebanon, through Shiite Iraq, and Shiite Iran. With this support we could possibly win over the support of the majority of Muslims, who are Sunni, possibly win over the support of the majority of Palestinians, who are Sunni, and relegate Shiites to three disjointed areas with different goals (Hezbollah - anti-Israel, Shiite Iraq - who knows what their true goals are, and Shiite Iran - goal of a larger theocracy – maybe? - but are distrusted across the Arab world because they are Persian).

Here is are a few excerpts from the article:

"The big issue that concerns us is what happens if the [Shiite Iraqi] government drops the ball and stops paying these guys," said Capt. Parsana Deoki, 32, of New York. "You'd have up to 400 SOI without jobs, without an income. That presents a problem. They have military training and access to weapons -- unemployed, with weapons, young men with an established chain of command. You can fill in the blanks…"

But Sons of Iraq leaders say their relationships with police commanders have been forged under heavy U.S. pressure and remain beset by mutual distrust.
"I feel sorry to say this," said Zaied Subhi, a Sons of Iraq leader. "There is no trust between us…"

U.S. soldiers see Sons of Iraq leaders as extraordinary sources of intelligence, but what makes them so attractive as allies -- their connections to the insurgency -- is also what makes the prospect of their dissolution so alarming…

If the Sons of Iraq are effectively dissolved, with GEN Odierno's approval, it looks like GEN Odierno will get his chance to fight another conventional battle against a reconstituted Sunni insurgency… this, I think, is the first mistake of the reign of GEN Odierno caused in part by military officers allowing neoconservative strategic goals to shape policy in Iraq.